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ACTIVE SOVEREIGNTY 
TIMOTHY ZICK* 
INTRODUCTION 
If there was something "revolutionary" about the recent 
federalism era, it was the manner in which the Court spoke of 
the states.! When they entered the Union, the states were 
sometimes referred to as mere corporate forms. 2 In recent 
federalism precedents, by contrast, the Rehnquist Court 
routinely referred to the states as "sovereign."3 The Court bathed 
the states in sovereign glory, inveighing against various federal 
insults to the states' "dignity," "esteem," and "respect." 4 The 
states are treated now more like nations or persons; they have 
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. I would like to thank 
John Barrett, Chris Borgen, Brian Tamanaha, and Nelson Tebbe for their helpful 
comments. I would also like to thank the participants at the "Federalism Past, Federalism 
Future" symposium, and the editors and staff of St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary. 
1 See Stephen G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1601 
(2002) (asserting that we are "in the midst of a constitutional revolution"). For reasons 
stated later, I believe "revolution" overstates matters; this Essay will refer to the "revival" 
of federalism. 
2 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 463·64, 477, 479 (1966) 
(Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1966) (comparing states to corporations). 
3 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (''The 
preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is 
consistent with their status as sovereign entities."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 
(1999) (noting that the Constitution recognizes "the essential sovereignty of the States"); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) ("It is an essential attribute of the 
States' retained sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous."); New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (holding that freedom from federal 
commandeering is "an incident of state sovereignty''). 
4 See Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 535 U.S. at 760, 769 (purpose of immunity is to protect state 
"dignity" and "respect"); Alden, 527 U.S. at 758 (Congress "must accord States the esteem 
due them as joint participants in a federal system"); New York, 505 U.S. at 188 
(emphasizing that states are not "mere political subdivisions of the United States" or 
"regional offices"); see also Judith Resnick & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: 
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 
(2003). 
541 
542 SI'. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:2 
constitutional rights to such things as autonomy, equality, and 
due process.5 
State sovereignty lies at the heart of perhaps our oldest 
constitutional conundrum. On the one hand, when the People 
fashioned the Constitution, they created a Union rather than a 
confederation of states. On the other, as the Court has said, the 
states "entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact."6 
In United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 7 Justice Kennedy 
said that the Framers had "split the atom of sovereignty" 
between the states and the national government.8 The federalism 
revival located state sovereignty in such things as ''background 
principles" of sovereign immunity, as well as notions of state 
consent, independence, and autonomy.9 The states would not 
have ratified the Constitution, the Court seemed to suggest, if 
they believed this would result in offensive federal 
encroachments, "commandeering'' of their officials, and waivers 
of their "sovereign immunity." 
There are those who would object to referring to the states as 
sovereign.lO They are not de jure sovereigns, in the sense of being 
supreme authorities. Under the Constitution, it is the People 
who are supremely sovereign.n When we refer to the states as 
"sovereign," it is in a derivative and de facto sense: The People 
delegate their sovereignty to the states. They make this 
delegation so that states can serve critical functions on their 
behalf. In this respect, state sovereignty and popular sovereignty 
are not actually in conflict, but complimentary. 
When we debate federalism, it is most often with reference to 
the actions of the Supreme Court or Congress. This Essay 
approaches federalism, and the recent federalism revival, from 
the perspective of the states. The states are often unthinkingly 
or reflexively referred to as "sovereign." But what does that tell 
5 See Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental 
States' Rights, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215 (2004). 
6 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). 
7 514 u.s. 779 (1995). 
8 See id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
9 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). 
10 See e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part I, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 35 (1998) [hereinafter Rakove]; Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part II, 3 
GREEN BAG 2d 51 (1999) [hereinafter Rakove II]. 
11 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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us, and them, about statehood? What does it actually mean for a 
state to be "sovereign" today? Statehood itself is rather thinly 
defined in the Constitution. The states' sovereignty is nowhere 
mentioned in the text, much less guaranteed to them. Despite 
this silence, resort to claims of state sovereignty are common, 
indeed increasingly so. The states, in particular, could benefit 
from an exposition of their sovereignty. If state sovereignty is to 
continue to be part of our constitutional language, the states 
must understand what makes for an effective claim to 
sovereignty. 
The Essay begins with a few general comments on the 
functions state sovereignty serves in relation to federalism. 
Accepting that it is the People who are ultimately sovereign, 
there are still benefits to describing and, what is more important, 
treating the states as sovereign entities. Sovereignty has 
enormous rhetorical power. But there is more than rhetoric 
involved; invocations of state sovereignty have real consequences. 
The normative defense of sovereignty in a most general sense is 
that it establishes boundaries and protocols. This is true, by the 
way, whether the claim to sovereignty is made by a State, a 
nation-state, or our domestic states.12 Sovereignty orders power. 
Given their relative disadvantage in terms of such things as 
funds and military might, not to mention the massive modern 
expansion of federal authority, it is no small matter for states to 
be regarded as "sovereign" with respect to an issue or in a policy 
area. Insofar as California, or Vermont, is considered to be 
"sovereign" - by citizens of their own and other states, and by 
other governments - they are more likely to be treated as 
deserving of respect and consideration. The idea of "dual 
sovereignty" helps to maintain the balance we refer to as 
"federalism." Systemically speaking, then, there is value in 
respecting the states as states. 
If the point of the Court's "sovereignty talk" was to re-order the 
federal-state balance of power, the project failed. There is 
ultimately very little in the way of substantive payoff for the 
states in the federalism revival. The Court was, and remains, 
12 This article will refer to a nation or country as a "State." The domestic states will 
be identified in the lower case. 
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willing to tolerate a host of federal encroachments that, from the 
states' perspective, are far from "dignified." This should come as 
little surprise. As an institution, the Court is poorly positioned to 
maintain something as complex and worldly as statehood or state 
sovereignty. It stands ready, as the revival demonstrated, to 
invalidate marginally encroaching federal laws. But this sort of 
minimalist judging cannot serve as a basis for a substantial re-
ordering of power. Nor is Congress positioned to re-order the 
balance of power. To be sure, when political expediency dictates, 
legislators sometimes speak in terms of devolution of power to 
the states. But Congress has not pushed through any revival of 
its own. Indeed, its usual instinct is to preempt the states. 
None of this means that state sovereignty is an ineffectual, or 
purely rhetorical, concept. This Essay posits that state 
sovereignty is a plausible source for a future federalism revival; 
one precipitated by the states. The problem does not lie with the 
concept of state sovereignty, but with the Court's flawed 
conception of it. 
To explain how state sovereignty might result in a meaningful 
federalism revival, this Essay will distinguish two conceptions of 
state sovereignty.l3 The first conception is the one the Court has 
pursued in recent federalism cases. This conception of 
sovereignty anthropomorphizes states. It seeks to elevate the 
states by raising their rank or status. It vests states, like nations 
or persons, with qualities like "dignity" and "esteem." It 
demands respect for the states as states. Sovereignty, and all of 
the corresponding constitutional rights that flow from it, are 
judicially conferred. I will call this concept status sovereignty. 
The second conception of sovereignty is called active 
souereignty.l4 Active sovereignty is the product of some 
conceptual borrowing. It is based upon international relations 
treatments of sovereignty.l5 This is not to suggest that states and 
13 For a more complete elaboration of state sovereignty, see Timothy Zick, Are the 
States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229 (2005). 
14 The resemblance to Justice Breyer's articulation of "active liberty'' in his recent 
book is purposeful. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 4-5 (2005) (distinguishing 
"active liberty'' from "civil liberty''). The conception of sovereignty I will be developing in 
this paper is of an "active" nature, rather than a defensive and negative one. In that 
sense, it resembles the "active liberty" Justice Breyer defends. 
15 Representative treatments include JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF 
SOVEREIGNTY? THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992); ABRAM 
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nation-states are sovereign in the same sense. Rather, 
international treatments can help us gain a conceptual foothold 
on sovereignty, a new understanding of what sovereignty means 
and looks like on the ground. Several observations might be 
made in this regard. First, claims to State sovereignty based 
solely on status are becoming less and less effective. For 
example, intrusions on internal State sovereignty occasioned by 
allegations of human rights violations are now commonplace.16 
Second, in more general terms, sovereignty has been partitioned 
and compromised by conditions such as globalization and the rise 
of supra-national governance structures. Third, given these and 
other circumstances of modernity, sovereignty is now less a 
function of status than of States serving critical functions. 
Sovereignty is a resource States must use to earn the respect and 
esteem of relevant actors and institutions. Finally, then, States 
are sovereign only insofar as they are treated as sovereign in an 
area or with respect to an issue. 
Sovereignty, then, is partial, behavioral, negotiated, and 
relative. It is earned in the world, not bestowed by courts. By 
serving functions, States (and states) prop up their own 
sovereignty. Their behavior strengthens future claims to 
sovereignty. This is the sovereignty the Framers seemed to have 
in mind for the states. It seems a fair inference that the drafters 
of the Constitution, while ensuring the states' existence, intended 
that their sovereignty was to be earned rather than granted. 
Thus, if there is to be a federalism revival, it will not occur in the 
Court or Congress. A revival will occur in the states and on the 
ground. It will be a bottom-up, rather than a top-down, 
phenomenon. 
Given this revision of our understanding of state sovereignty, 
the deficiencies of status sovereignty are rather obvious. In brief, 
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1996); MICHAEL ROSS FOWLER & JULIE 
MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND 
APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996); 
CYNTHIA WEBER ET AL., SIMULATING SOVEREIGNTY: INTERVENTION, THE STATE, AND 
SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE (1994). 
16 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. 
L. 31, 41-42 (1995-1996) (describing compliance and enforcement trend with regard to 
international human rights). 
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it is not merely that status sovereignty provides little in the way 
of substantive protection or benefit to states. The problem is 
much more serious. Status sovereignty is wholly defensive and 
negative. It provides no positive way forward for states. It does 
not challenge states to rethink or refashion the federal-state 
balance on their own terms. Status sovereignty actually imperils 
statehood by encouraging this sort of passivity. The lesson of 
active sovereignty is that states must view their sovereignty not 
as inherent, but as relative and always at stake. Sovereignty, in 
other words, is not a matter of being, but doing. 
There is some reason for cautious optimism that a federalism 
revival based upon principles of active sovereignty might occur. 
The states are actively taking the lead on matters of critical 
importance to citizens, such as wage reform, environmental 
reform, food safety, and access to prescription drugs.17 They are 
aggressively taking positions on fundamental social issues like 
abortion and same-sex marriage. In some instances, states are 
pursuing an independent view of the federal-state balance of 
power rather than merely accepting the balance dictated to them 
by tradition or static conceptions of what is properly "local." 
States are also expanding their role as political communities by 
broadening opportunities for direct governance through initiative 
and referendum machinery. They are moving beyond traditional 
notions of dealing with each other, and with federal authorities, 
by pooling or sharing their sovereignty in unique arrangements 
and pacts. States are even increasingly rejecting antiquated 
notions of their "proper" role in the world. Within limits still 
largely undefined, states are acting as, and being treated as, de 
facto powers in their own right in international contexts. There 
is much more that states could be doing as active sovereigns. If 
states take hold of their sovereignty, the beneficiaries of 
innovation and activity will not be the states, as under status 
sovereignty, but the people. 
17 See Pam Belluck, The Not-So United States, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April23, 2006, 
at WK 4 (noting a number of policy areas in which states are proceeding on their own, 
rather than waiting for federal proposals). 
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I. Statehood and Sovereignty 
The core notion of sovereignty traces back to the King, the ur-
sovereign. Classic sovereigns were considered ultimate 
authorities in a territory. In the international context, States 
have long suffered encroachments on their internal and external 
authority. In the new global social and economic environment, 
this is now inevitable. No state may claim the right, as 
sovereign, to violate human rights for example.18 As the 
European nations have recently discovered with the advent of the 
European Union, sovereignty is not, if it ever truly was, an ali-or-
nothing proposition.19 If more evidence of this were needed, 
consider the long ago transfer of "sovereignty" to the Iraqi 
people.2o 
Yet sovereignty has not receded into oblivion. Indeed, far from 
it. At home and abroad, diplomats, officials, academics, and 
courts make claims to and based upon sovereignty. Despite 
serious objections from those who find the concept troubling or 
even meaningless, sovereignty remains a critical aspect of the 
language and structure of governance.21 
This Part briefly examines the relationship between state 
sovereignty and federalism. It then distinguishes between two 
conceptions of sovereignty. The first, "status sovereignty," is the 
concept the Supreme Court has relied upon in its recent 
federalism revival. The second, "active sovereignty," is derived 
from reflections on the function and operation of sovereignty in 
the international context. Again, I do not suggest that States 
and our domestic states possess identical sovereignties. Our 
states can, however, learn something from internationalists 
about how State sovereignty is effectively managed and 
18 See Henkin, supra note 17, at 41-42 (describing compliance and enforcement trend 
with regard to international human rights). 
19 See LIESBET HOOGHE & GARY MARKS, MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION (2001). 
20 See S.C. Res. 1546, ~ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (2004) (''Reaffirming the 
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq."). 
21 Skeptical treatments include Rakove, supra note 10, Rakove II, supra note 10, and 
CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 15. The debate cannot be joined here. Let it suffice to say 
that sovereignty seems no more or less meaningless than, say, the "rule of law," or the 
"social contract," or even "democracy." Each of these concepts has changed meaning over 
time, to be sure. However, each undoubtedly has meaning. 
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maintained. The Part concludes with a discussion of the many 
deficiencies of and objections to status sovereignty. 
A. Ordering Power 
The domestic states are not, of course, classically sovereign. 
Having ratified the Constitution, they consented to its 
supremacy. They recognized the People's will as controlling. The 
states were not granted the external sovereignty of States; they 
have no constitutional authority, for instance, to engage in 
diplomatic relations with foreign nations. Still, the framers 
referred to state sovereignty on several occasions.22 The Supreme 
Court has long characterized federalism as based upon the 
principle of "dual sovereignty." And the mantra of the federalism 
revival was that the states are "sovereign." 
If we assume that sovereignty is not, as some skeptics contend, 
utterly meaningless, then what does it mean to suggest that a 
state in our system of governance is sovereign? How does this 
concept relate to federalism? One answer, of course, is that 
sovereignty serves as a useful rhetorical device. Skeptics have 
long contended that this is the primary function of sovereignty.23 
There is indeed powerful symbolism in the concept of state 
sovereignty. Moreover, the Court has invoked the term with only 
the most minimal discussion of its theoretical basis, which of 
course adds to the concern that its use is purely strategic or 
political. 
But sovereignty is doing more than rhetorical work in the 
federalism area. It serves primarily as a shorthand expression 
for the idea that states cannot be ignored, mistreated, bullied, or 
simply run roughshod over. State sovereignty represents the 
idea that there are limits to what federal authorities can ask of 
the states as states. It guides and constrains actions within the 
constitutional hierarchy the Framers provided. As it does in 
22 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick 
ed., 1987) ("[T]he State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty 
which they before had, and which were not ... exclusively delegated to the United 
States."); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293-94 (James Madison) ("[T]he States will retain 
under the proposed Constitution a very extensive portion of active sovereignty."). 
23 See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 10. 
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international contexts, sovereignty marks boundaries. It creates 
protocols and various behavioral expectations. 
In this respect, the Court is using sovereignty in a most 
common fashion, namely to order power. Scholars and statesmen 
have recognized that sovereignty serves a variety of functions 
related to this core purpose.24 It draws attention to subsidiarity, 
reminding superior powers that the interests of "secondary" 
institutions must be accounted for, that their views and interests 
must be respected. Having this sort of ordering principle is 
critical to the domestic states, which labor under the most severe 
disadvantages. Statehood itself is only minimally addressed by 
the Constitution.25 The states are granted constitutional 
permanency; they have, in other words, a fundamental right to 
exist. Explicit constitutional rules require that states must be 
preserved against attack, dissolution, and territorial violation.26 
States are also deemed separate governmental and political 
entities; they have the right, generally speaking, to arrange their 
own governmental institutions. States also have critical 
participatory rights, including the right to vote on proposed 
constitutional amendments.27 Finally, they possess a degree of 
interpretive independence with respect to their own laws and 
constitutional provisions. 
These are minimal guarantees for statehood. Sovereignty 
provides a further basis for state claims to legitimacy, deference, 
and recognition. It legitimizes and empowers states, allowing 
them to operate as if they are positioned to resist a superior 
federal authority, even if in reality they are not so positioned. 
State sovereignty provides leverage at the bargaining table. 
Indeed, states often negotiate to have the "final say" on critical 
matters like education or health policy, even in the face of federal 
policies that are constitutionally supreme. Finally, sovereignty 
24 For a discussion of the usefulness of sovereignty in this regard, see FOWLER & 
BUNCK, supra note 16. 
25 See Zick, supra note 13, at 288-92 (discussing the "constitutive rules" of statehood). 
26 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within 
the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or 
more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States 
concerned as well as of the Congress."); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869) (the 
Constitution "looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States"), 
overruled by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885). 
27 See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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creates positive state pride and confidence. This is no small 
matter. For a sovereign state, in contrast to a merely 
decentralized locus of authority, has powerful incentives to 
distinguish itself and to innovate on behalf of and provide for its 
own community of citizens.28 
Sovereignty thus retains salience in the federalism area for a 
variety of reasons. It is a symbol of limited federal power. State 
sovereignty establishes a degree of order and clarity in the 
largely undefined area of vertical governmental relations. It 
reminds that a state is not merely a permanent fixture or 
territory, but a power in its own right. It sometimes levels an 
otherwise uneven playing field. Skeptics and critics may wish its 
demise, but sovereignty retains vitality. Rather than dismiss it, 
we must endeavor to better understand sovereignty and its 
implications for federalism. 
B. Two Sovereignties 
Sovereignty, like federalism, is not self-defining. To 
understand the implications of the recent federalism revival, and 
to assess the prospects for future revivals, we must consider the 
nature, character, and substance of state sovereignty. Aside 
from setting outer boundaries, do the manifestations of the 
revival - principally, limitations on lawsuits against states, 
prohibition of federal commandeering of state officials, and 
protection of states from other perceived encroachments -
provide a framework for refashioning the relationship among 
state, local, and central powers? What advantages does the 
sovereignty the Court has bestowed actually provide to the 
modern state? And if the answer, upon reflection, is "few or even 
none," then how might we re-conceive sovereignty such that it 
does provide a stronger foundation for federalism? 
1. Status Sovereignty 
In a word, the most recent federalism revival has primarily 
brought about a change in state status. The tangible benefits to 
28 But see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National 
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908 (1994) (arguing that federalism serves none of the 
values commonly associated with it, and that states primarily serve the function of 
"facilitating decentralization"). 
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states as a result of the revival have been remarkably minor, 
relatively trivial in fact. The manner in which we speak of the 
states, on the other hand, has changed dramatically in the past 
decade or so. At the core of "status sovereignty" is the notion 
that states inherently possess characteristics like "dignity'' and 
"esteem." States, the Court has repeatedly reminded us, are not 
"mere political subdivisions;" rather, they are entitled to the 
degree of "respect" due a co-equal governmental institution.29 
In a sense this is indeed revolutionary. At the founding, states, 
like the colonies that preceded them, were likened more or less to 
mere corporations. Madison identified a "gradation" of authority 
"from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to 
the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty."30 "The 
states," Madison said, "are not in that high degree Sovereign;" 
"they are Corporations with the power of Bye Laws."31 
Corporations do not possess dignity or esteem. And governments 
need not "respect" corporations, which are of course merely forms 
of their own creation. 
Without status, the states lacked all but the most basic rights, 
privileges, or immunities-those conferred expressly in the 
Constitution itself. Thus, for example, the early Court held that 
the states did not possess any right to be immune from lawsuits 
by citizens of other states.32 No state dignitary interest, the 
Court said, could outweigh citizens' interests in obtaining 
remedies for state wrongs.33 
This was the once degraded status of the states. At least 
nominally, the states occupy a much higher rank today. 
Corporations lack dignity. But nations or persons have these 
attributes. They also have fundamental rights. Nations enjoy 
certain legal immunities. Persons, as a result of their inherent 
dignity, possess fundamental rights to equal treatment, due 
process, autonomy, privacy, and much more. 
29 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
30 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 463-64, 477, 479 (1966) 
(Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1966). 
31 Id. 
32 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 447 (1793), superseded by, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. 
33 See id. at 472 (Wilson, J.) (states must yield to larger "purposes of society); id. at 
455 (describing a state as the "inferior contrivance of man"). 
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The core of the federalism revival has been the transformation 
of states, from something akin to corporate forms to far more 
dignified nations or persons. Almost by sheer linguistic fiat, the 
Court has bestowed on states not only the inherent "dignity" of 
nations or persons, but a host of constitutional rights as well. 
Today states, like nations and persons, have "rights" to privacy, 
autonomy, equality, and due process.34 Nothing in the 
Constitution itself mandated this change in status. It is the 
result of what the Court itself has called ''background principles" 
and constitutional and historical suppositions. Dignity, esteem, 
and the new states' rights are, the Court has said, inherent 
attributes of statehood. They follow naturally from the fact of 
being what the Constitution minimally refers to as a "state." 
These analogies - to nationhood or personhood - suffer from 
some rather obvious technical flaws. These are not worth 
pursuing here. Far more seriously, this revival has provided 
relatively little tangible or other gain for states. When one gets 
to the heart of the matter, what seems to animate the "states' 
rights Justices" more than anything else is the offense, the 
perceived slight, to states that results from singling them out for 
what turn out to be rather minor burdens or offenses. The Court 
has not objected, for example, to overarching federal laws that 
regulate states, so long as they treat states the same as regulated 
private actors.35 The commerce power has seemingly rebounded 
from the minor limitations announced in cases like Lopez and 
Morrison.36 Although it has been little remarked upon in 
commentary regarding the federalism revival, the Court has 
routinely interpreted federal laws as preempting state laws.37 
Moreover, although the process seems less than "dignified," the 
Court has not moved to put an end to the incessant dangling 
before the states of millions in federal monies, to "encourage" 
their cooperation in federal endeavors. There are, as well, plenty 
34 See Zick, supra note 5, at 250-81 (discussing newly discovered rights of states). 
35 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). 
36 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating civil action 
provision of Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (invalidating Gun Free School Zones Act). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 
2195, 2215 (2005) (upholding application of federal Controlled Substances Act to locally 
produced and used marijuana). 
37 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (holding that 
Massachusetts law regulating labeling of cigarettes was impliedly preempted). 
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of chinks in the armor of state sovereign immunity.38 Finally, the 
actual burdens the states were spared under the "anti-
commandeering" principle were minimal, indeed trivial, and in 
any event easily accomplished through other means.39 
It may be that the status revival is a predicate to a revival of 
more substantive dimensions. But the most recent federalism 
decisions suggest that the Court has already made its point and 
that it is more or less content having done so to hold the lines it 
has drawn.40 Indeed, the decisions, taken together, suggest that 
the Court's federalism revival was largely cosmetic; the Court 
seemed to have little appetite for radical alteration of the federal-
state balance. It was prepared, in quite minimalist fashion, to 
identify certain outer boundaries for federal power. But the 
Court was not in any sense seeking to fundamentally alter "our 
Federalism."41 
2. Active Sovereignty 
Sovereignty - like federalism, or privacy, or equality - is not a 
static concept. The concept of sovereignty has undergone 
massive changes since the Constitution was framed. The 
negative, exclusive, preemptive sovereignty of Austin, Bodin, and 
Hobbes has long been on the decline. Modern international 
theories of sovereignty have been influenced by a climate 
characterized by globalization, supra-national governance 
structures, and other modern conditions. As the European Union 
and other collaborative ventures demonstrate, sovereignty has as 
a result become partial, partitioned, and relative.42 
Once seemingly anomalous, partial or divided sovereignty is 
now a global phenomenon. Thus, as in domestic constitutional 
38 See Jesse H. Choper and John C. Yoo, Who's Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? 
The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2006). 
39 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (relieving state officials 
of temporary functions under federal gun control law). The federalism revival left largely 
untouched Congress's commerce and spending powers. 
40 See Raich; see also Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) 
(upholding waiver of state immunity under Family and Medical Leave Act). 
41 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
42 See generally NICK BERNARD, MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002); GENE M. LYONS & MICHAEL MAsTANDUNO, BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (1995). 
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disciplines, international theorists must now strive to 
understand how claims to sovereignty can have meaning in a 
world where powers routinely and substantially interfere with 
one another, and where claims to supremacy and preemption are 
routinely challenged. There is not adequate space here to 
describe the various circulating theories and meanings of 
sovereignty in international relations and other disciplines.43 But 
work in these areas can be used to sketch a competing vision of 
state sovereignty, one that differs markedly from the status 
sovereignty that has bestowed little more than limited defenses 
on the domestic states. I will call this competing conception 
"active sovereignty." 
If one thing has become clear from recent developments with 
regard to international Statehood, it is that the conferral of 
status alone does not guarantee State independence, autonomy, 
equality, or any other right or privilege. Merely calling 
something "sovereign" simply does not generally make it so. 
States can now rarely, if ever, coerce, dictate to, or disregard 
members of their communities. In a word, modern sovereignty is 
relational.44 A State's claim to sovereignty is only as legitimate 
as its effective exercise of the functions associated with 
Statehood, both within external regimes that order power and 
within States' own political communities.45 
Because it is a function of serving functions, sovereignty is 
increasingly viewed as principally behavioral, rather than 
legal.46 As many international relations scholars have argued, 
sovereignty is not a given, brute fact. It is more accurately 
conceived as a social construct, a fact generated by collective 
agreement.47 Insofar as the domestic states are concerned, this 
agreement depends, first, on the basic constitutive rules of 
statehood. As mentioned earlier, these rules entitle states to 
such things as preservation, separate and independent existence, 
43 For a brief overview, see Zick I, supra note 13, at 257-64. 
44 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, In Memoriam: Abram Chayes, 114 HARV. L. REV. 682, 
685 (2001). 
45 See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15. 
46 See Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 329, 330 (2004) 
(distinguishing legal and behavioral sovereignty). 
47 See STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 15 (collecting 
treatments of statehood and sovereignty as social constructions). 
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direct participation in matters of national governance, and a 
degree of interpretive independence with respect to local laws. 
These rules define a baseline for constitutional statehood. They 
make it possible to speak in terms of a system of "dual 
sovereignty." But they do not, a fortiori, make states sovereign. 
The process of construction requires a great deal more from 
states than that they meet the minimal definition of "state." 
Generally speaking, collective agreements with regard to state 
sovereignty depend upon states consistently and effectively 
exercising a bundle of competences. States, through their actions 
and the reactions to their initiatives, become associated with 
these functions over time. In brief, states are sovereign under 
this view insofar as those affected by state actions- other states, 
federal authorities, citizens, and even foreign nations -
ultimately agree to treat states as sovereigns. 
Like status sovereignty, active sovereignty relies to some 
extent upon symbols and linguistic devices. The language of 
statehood conveys and helps constitute the institutional fact of 
state sovereignty. As we have seen, status sovereignty relies 
upon anthropomorphisms, things like state "dignity," "offense," 
and loss of "esteem." According to status sovereignty, the states 
are like inherently dignified nations, or persons. In contrast, 
active sovereignty's symbols are themselves dynamic. They are 
also firmly embedded in judicial, political, and social discourses. 
To generate sovereignty and maintain it, states must earn the 
respect and esteem of citizens and institutions by acting as 
agents, trustees, communities, and laboratories of innovation.48 
These are the Framers' original symbols for statehood. They 
recognized that states' claims to sovereignty would depend not 
upon their legal status as states, but upon how they would use 
the resource of sovereignty in the world- to bargain, cooperate, 
cajole, and assert claims on their own and their citizens' 
behalves. 49 
48 See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), at 297 (state and federal 
governments are ''but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with 
different powers, and designed for different purposes"). 
49 See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), at 296 (noting that state power 
would "extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, 
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State"). 
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A constructive account of active sovereignty can help explain 
why the states are still regarded as "sovereign" at all in a 
constitutional regime where superior powers are nearly always 
able, as a brute matter, to override their prerogatives. The key, 
according to this theory, lies in reaching collective agreements or 
shared understandings that states should be recognized as 
sovereign because they act and behave as such. In sum, a state 
can claim to be "sovereign" insofar as it performs essential 
sovereign functions and convinces relevant constituencies that it 
is doing so both consistently and effectively. The modern state's 
sovereignty is thus not inherently given, but always at stake. 
In general terms, then, sovereignty is not primarily a negative, 
prohibitive defense. It is a positive resource governments use 
and maintain by actively exercising and trading upon it. 
Understanding that its sovereignty is always, in some sense, at 
stake, the active sovereign constantly innovates. Where national 
or supra-national solutions fail or are not forthcoming, the active 
sovereign steps in to fill critical gaps. It takes the lead on issues 
that are of fundamental importance to a community's health, 
morals and welfare, whether or not those issues have historically 
or traditionally been the province of some other actor. The active 
sovereign engages citizens by encouraging democratic 
participation in all forums of the political community, including 
courts of law. The active sovereign assists the collection of states 
in carrying out national or international prerogatives in times of 
emergency or other critical need. Recognizing the exigencies of 
the modern governance environment, the active sovereign does 
not always seek to stand on its own; rather, it surrenders some 
independence by pooling or sharing its sovereignty with other 
states and institutions to achieve common goals. Finally, the 
active sovereign refuses to be bound by traditional notions of its 
"proper" sphere of activity, whether this means seeking 
opportunities on behalf of its citizens in new geographic areas or 
in new regional or other governance regimes. 
Active sovereignty differs from status sovereignty m 
fundamental ways. It is positive rather than negative, 
innovative rather than static or tied to traditional notions 
regarding the balance of power, and relational rather than 
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exclusionary or preemptive. It 1s earned m the world, not 
bestowed by courts. 
C. Status, Function, and Federalism 
For those who truly believe that power should be re-directed to 
the states, the goal of any revival of federalism must be to see 
that statehood not merely survives but thrives. This is not 
merely a matter of improving the states' position in the federal 
system, or some aesthetic makeover. A revival must invigorate 
the states. It must provide them with something substantive, 
such that they remain integral parts of the system of governance. 
Assuming that this, or something like it, is the ultimate 
objective, there are four primary reasons for states (and, as well, 
courts and legislators who favor a meaningful "federalism") to 
prefer active sovereignty to status sovereignty. 
First, status sovereignty lacks a principled theoretical 
grounding. Status sovereignty is the product, the Court says, of 
certain ''background principles," inferences, and suppositions. 
The Court implies that a state is like a nation, or a person; but 
we are never told why this is so and, if so, what implications 
these analogies portend for federalism. This leaves status 
sovereignty vulnerable to the claim that "sovereignty" is being 
used as a tool of power politics rather than a principled basis for 
a workable federalism. Improving state status does not provide 
states with a deeper understanding of statehood or sovereignty. 
It does not provide states, or anyone else for that matter, with a 
framework for working through the complexities of federalism -
past, present, or future. 
Second, status sovereignty is actually dangerous to the welfare 
of states. As noted, statehood itself is rather thinly elaborated in 
the Constitution. Little is conferred upon the states as a matter 
of constitutional right. The fairest inference from text and 
history is that everything else must be earned. Status 
sovereignty gives the states their "dignity," but nothing else. 
Because it is entirely negative and defensive, status sovereignty 
encourages state passivity. It requires nothing of states, other 
than that they meet the rudimentary definition of "state." Status 
sovereignty does not encourage the states to consider, as one 
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internationalist has put it, "a ground for a forward policy of one's 
own."50 It operates merely as a proscription on the action of some 
other power rather than a positive source of state energy or 
power. A meaningful revival of federalism cannot be based on 
this sort of defensive, passive conception of statehood and state 
sovereignty. 
Third, status sovereignty raises what might be called "moral" 
issues. It has been applied, in part, to deny citizens access to 
judicial processes for the purpose of holding states accountable 
for alleged constitutional violations. By virtue of their status, 
what one scholar calls "laggard" states have thus been excused 
from compliance with the law.51 In a sense, then, status 
sovereignty licenses states to misbehave. More generally, this 
conception of state sovereignty turns democracy on its head. It 
places the state, which holds the people's sovereignty in trust, 
above its citizens.52 This undermines basic federalism ideals like 
state agency, trusteeship, and community. The problem is graver 
still. In the political community of the United States, "anti-
commandeering" principles leave the impression that states have 
some constitutional right to be let alone, that they cannot be 
enlisted to serve the greater good even in times of national crisis 
or emergency. Status sovereignty prevents the redress of 
constitutional violations, inverts democratic principles, and 
causes fissures in the notion of political community. Rather than 
ensure that states are active participants in the governance 
structure, status sovereignty actually casts states as 
obstructionist outliers. 
Finally, history rather plainly demonstrates that status 
sovereignty will not sustain a workable and robust federalism. 
Previous revivals, similarly grounded upon formalistic 
conceptions, have failed the tests of time and circumstance. One 
revival relied upon the notion of "enclave" sovereignty, in which 
50 ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 260 (1986). 
51 See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and 
Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (2004). 
52 See Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude For State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 81, 86 (2001) ("[T]he notion that states are organically bestowed 
with a dignity incident to all sovereigns rests in tension with the notion that states are 
mere creatures of and subservient to the truly sovereign people."). 
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the Court sought to carve exclusive areas of state concern from 
the larger federalism mosaic.53 Another relied upon formalistic 
notions of "commerce."54 But the lesson of these so-called 
"revivals" is that federalism operates on the ground, in the world. 
It is too complex to be ordered with reference to such simple 
legalisms. 
Improving the status of states will order power to some small 
degree. It will establish outer boundaries. There is, however, no 
escaping the fact that states must tolerate a variety of 
interferences with their internal sovereignty. The Court's most 
recent precedents, which balk at extending sovereign immunity 
and envision commerce and spending powers of considerable 
breadth, signal tacit recognition of this unavoidable reality. In 
the end, status sovereignty provides some short-term benefits to 
state treasuries. It may make the states "feel" better. But it 
provides no foundation for a real revival of statehood or 
federalism. 
II. The Active Sovereign: Federalism Revival? 
Let us consider, then, the implications of active sovereignty for 
the future of our federalism. States will perform many functions 
regardless of whether they are labeled "sovereign." State officials 
will work on behalf of their citizens because they were elected or 
appointed to do just that. The active sovereign does more than 
this bare minimum, however. It does more that merely subsist. 
It extends itself, knowing that its sovereignty is in some sense 
always at stake. 
Federalism has long been thought to dictate that certain 
matters are "local" and others "national." The active sovereign 
seeks to remake federalism on its own terms, rather than on the 
terms dictated to it by tradition or some more powerful sovereign. 
To remake federalism on their own terms, or at least attempt 
this, states must understand how valid claims to sovereignty are 
actively made and sustained over time. This Part will review 
some of the on-the-ground activities that might serve as a 
53 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (abandoning 
efforts to identify exclusive enclaves of state power). 
54 See e.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
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foundation for a federalism revival in and by the states. There is 
much, by way of innovation and energy, for other states to 
imitate, and to expand upon, in the examples described below. 
The basic lesson for states in what follows is that the revival 
must come from within. 
A. Taking the Lead: State Innovations 
The Framers believed that the states would serve the people in 
several functional capacities. They perceived states as agents 
and trustees of the people, and as places where innovative 
policymaking would occur.55 States would earn their sovereignty, 
the Framers believed, by providing critical services to and 
connections for local populations. But federalism is obviously far 
more complex today than it was at the framing. States, as the 
examples below illustrate, are no longer confining themselves to 
what might traditionally have been considered "local" matters. 
They are engaged in efforts to alter the federal-state balance on 
their own terms, either by branching into areas of "national" 
concern or taking back what they view as issues rightfully theirs 
in the first place. 
Indeed, states have increasingly been active with respect to 
critical policy matters that Washington cannot, or will not, 
address. Mter a recent period of dormancy, owing no doubt in 
part to state budgetary shortfalls, states during the past decade 
have taken a leading position on a number of critical issues. So 
much attention is regularly focused on Congress, and on the 
battle over federalism waged in the Supreme Court, that this 
activity tends to receive inadequate attention. But states are 
beginning to get noticed again. They are beginning to 
aggressively push back against coercive federal laws. They are 
filling substantial gaps where federal legislation has stalled. 
News items noting that the states have "taken the lead" are 
becoming much more common. 
Although many recent state innovations might be listed, I will 
briefly highlight just a few. For example, states have been 
leading the way in adopting innovative policies relating to critical 
55 See Althouse, supra note 51, at 1750· 76 (elaborating on "laboratory" metaphor). 
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energy and environmental issues.56 As federal clean air laws 
have been watered down and riddled with exemptions, states 
have been forced to act creatively to enforce air quality 
standards. For example, the North Carolina Attorney General 
recently sued the Tennessee Valley Authority to prevent out-of-
state power plants from sending air pollution into the state on 
the ground that the pollution constitutes a nuisance.57 
Health matters have been a special area of recent state 
innovation. The nation is experiencing a health care crisis. 
Recent state activity in this area has been a matter of emergency 
and necessity. For example, several states recently intervened 
when the newly revised Medicare prescription drug program left 
many low-income citizens without adequate coverage.58 
California took emergency action to assist nearly one million 
citizens in filling their prescriptions. Several other states were 
forced to take similar action during the drug program's troubled 
transition period. Massachusetts recently enacted landmark 
health care legislation, providing health care for virtually all of 
its citizens.59 
Pharmaceutical costs in general have been an increasing area 
of national concern. Congress has done little to solve the problem 
of rising drug prices. But states from Maine to Florida have 
offered their own unique solutions.60 Maine developed a 
purchasing pool to give the state more leverage when purchasing 
from drug firms. Florida and Michigan provided by law that if 
drug companies want access to their markets, they must offer 
deep discounts on drugs. Massachusetts and other states 
employed comparison shopping to lower their citizens' costs. The 
states have acted in a host of other health-related areas, 
including medical malpractice reform, food safety, and 
restrictions on tobacco use, where federal authorities have 
56 See, e.g., Rebecca Smith, States Take Lead in Widening Use of Green Energy, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 22, 2004, at A8. 
57 See Editorial, New Strategy on Clean Air, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at A12. 
58 See Robert Pear, States Intervene After Drug Plan Hits Early Snags, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 2006, at Al. 
59 See Pam Belluck & Katie Zezima, Massachusetts Legislation on Insurance Becomes 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2006. 
60 See Abraham McLaughlin, States Take Lead on Drug Costs Cuts, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2002, at 1. 
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experienced decades-long stalemates or have done little or 
nothing owing to industry pressure and influence. 
Living wage issues have become another area of acute concern. 
Congress remains gridlocked on these issues too. But states, as 
agents and trustees, have recently stepped in to fill this critical 
void. Maryland, for example, enacted a law that would require 
large businesses to cover a set percentage of employee health 
costs.61 States have also taken the lead on raising the minimum 
wage.62 Despite a decade-long freeze in the federal minimum 
wage, nearly half of the civilian labor force now lives in states 
where the rate is higher than the federal minimum. This has 
resulted in a shift of lobbying attention, as labor officials see 
more meaningful prospects for reform in the states. 
Active sovereignty also entails states making claims to 
sovereignty with respect to fundamental social issues as well. 
Many states are already doing so. They have made strong claims 
to sovereignty in enacting laws and constitutional amendments 
regarding abortion, the death penalty, and same-sex marriage.63 
Thus, active sovereignty, like federalism itself, does not 
automatically lead to "liberal" policies. It favors neither "liberal" 
nor "conservative" causes. Active sovereignty encourages 
sovereign states to determine fundamental social policies and to 
innovate even with respect to issues of national concern. 
These examples could be multiplied many times over. The 
point is that states must recognize that fewer and fewer issues 
are matters solely for federal action. An active sovereign does not 
wait for federal action that may never come. It does not assume 
that any issue is necessarily outside its competence. As the 
Medicare episode demonstrates, that sort of passivity can be 
physically harmful, even deadly, for a state's citizens. When 
states perform emergency functions competently, they maintain 
and reinforce their sovereignty. When they fail, however, as 
many believe they did in the days and weeks following Hurricane 
61 See Michael Barbaro, Maryland Sets a Health Cost for Wal-Mart, N_y. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 2006, at Al. 
62 See John M. Broder, States Take Lead In Push To Raise Minimum Wages, N.Y. 
TlMES, Jan. 2, 2006, at Al. 
63 See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Court Limits Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. Times, 
March 30, 2006; Belluck, supra note 17 (noting recent South Dakota law prohibiting 
abortions except where the mother's life is in danger). 
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Katrina, for example, the states undermine their- and perhaps 
other states' - claims to sovereignty. Insofar as the states' first 
reaction in times of turmoil is to look to federal officials for relief, 
they place their sovereignty at stake.64 As they earn respect and 
sovereignty, so too can states lose it by failing to provide positive 
solutions. Mississippi officials seemed to realize this; Louisiana 
officials unfortunately did not. The next disaster, which may not 
be far off, will be handled in light of successes and failures 
previously demonstrated at the local level. Proposals to 
federalize emergency response efforts are already on the table. 
Passive and incompetent states invite this sort of federal 
intervention. This will likely be one of Katrina's enduring 
lessons. 
Although active sovereignty generally focuses on prescribing a 
program of positive self-help for states, there are some lessons for 
the judiciary as well. One of the ironies of the Rehnquist Court's 
federalism revival was the extent to which the Court was willing 
to interpret broadly the doctrine of implied preemption. This 
may have two systemic effects. The first, and most obvious, is 
that federal law displaces the very state innovations we have 
been examining. Whatever minor gains flowed from the states' 
status revival can be erased several-fold by the preemption of 
state health and safety programs. The second effect may be that 
states, concerned that their efforts will be for naught, will act 
more passively and timidly. Rather than pursue their own way 
forward, states will await federal action that may not be 
forthcoming. Courts committed to federalism and state 
sovereignty should approach preemption and other doctrines that 
undermine state action with far greater concern for these effects. 
Active sovereignty obviously requires far greater energy and 
innovation than status sovereignty does. It requires that states 
begin to fundamentally and independently rethink the federal-
state balance. As Professor Amar has suggested, "federalism 
cuts both ways."65 States "can gain political goodwill" by 
protecting their citizens from federal shortcomings.66 By acting 
-
64 See Editorial, Out to Lunch, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Oct. 21, 2005, at A14. 
65 Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1428 (1987). 
66 See id. at 1428-29. 
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in an innovative fashion, states can use their sovereignty not as a 
defensive shield but as a "toolO to right government wrongs."67 
B. Democracy and Community 
The framers created the states not only to be agents, trustees, 
and laboratories of innovation, but also as distinct communities. 
An active sovereign strives for distinction. Indeed, despite many 
similarities, states are unique in important respects. Even such 
seemingly minor things as state slogans ought to be viewed as 
demonstrative of state sovereignty. "Don't Mess With Texas," 
"Live Free or Die," and the recently coined "New Jersey: Come 
See for Yourself' are all expressions of separateness and 
distinction. They express something about their political 
communities and citizenries, whether it is swagger, or 
libertarianism, or self-deprecation. These are, of course, minor 
symbolic matters. They must be considered along with state 
governance institutions, policies, geography, common industry, 
and other things that comprise a state community. 
The states are political communities. One of the most critical 
functions states serve as political communities is to provide local 
opportunities for citizens to exercise self-governance. Today 
there is abundant talk of popular constitutionalism.68 However, 
the fact remains that the Constitution contains no distinct 
mechanism whereby "the People" can participate directly in day-
to-day governance. But the states, as derivative sovereigns, can 
provide such opportunities. To the extent they do so, active 
states further strengthen their claims to sovereignty by 
strengthening their ties to the citizenry. 
Some of the innovations described above resulted from direct 
democracy mechanisms like state initiatives and referenda. 
Roughly half the states currently allow for citizen initiatives. 
Policies determined in this direct fashion run the gamut, from 
affirmative action to stem cell research to redistricting to same-
sex marriage. More states should provide for direct governance 
of this sort, and states should continue to expand the subjects 
67 See id. 
68 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW {2004). 
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that can be addressed in this fashion. These measures can come 
substantially to define a community. By initiative, California 
has sought to establish itself as the "Silicon Valley'' for stem cell 
research. Oregon, as a result of its high-profile battle over 
assisted suicide, is now indelibly associated with the 
fundamental right to choose how one's life ends. Through these 
governance mechanisms, states can stake out an identity based 
upon tax policies, individual rights, or any other characteristic 
that can be put to the people at the ballot. 
Although many states are showing vital progress m 
encouraging political participation, there are many "laggard" 
states too. The duty to provide opportunities for political 
participation extends beyond the initiative and referendum. An 
active sovereign does not, as many states currently do, prohibit 
any class of citizen from exercising the franchise. Measures that 
prevent felons, or parolees, or probationers, from voting 
undermine state claims to sovereignty by severing a critical tie 
with whole classes of citizens.69 These measures devalue the 
notion of political community. So do claims to "sovereign 
immunity." Courts are part of the political community. And 
open courts are a critical aspect of self-governance. The active 
sovereign does not seek judicial immunities when faced with 
allegations of wrongdoing. Rather, the sovereign state 
voluntarily waives its immunity. States must recognize that 
waivers of immunity are exercises of state sovereignty, not 
derogations of it. 
States communities do not exist in isolation. The domestic 
states are part of a community of United States. The active 
sovereign accepts that its internal sovereignty can be invaded for 
a variety of legitimate reasons relating to community interests. 
Many States have had to come to terms with this fact in the 
international context. Just as most European States must now 
bargain within the community of the Union, states have always 
had to bargain and perform in collective regimes. This means 
that they must cooperate, compromise, and sometimes settle. 
Bargains once made, such as the bargain on radioactive waste at 
69 See Editorial, Voting Rights Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at A24 (noting 
that felon voting bans denied the franchise to some five million people in the most recent 
federal elections). 
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issue in New York v. United States, 70 must be honored by 
sovereign states. Otherwise, its future claims to sovereignty will 
likely be compromised. Because state sovereignty is relational, 
collective needs may outweigh a state's own interests. State 
sovereignty sometimes entails a claim to autonomy. But there 
are times when sovereignty lies in effective cooperation rather 
than isolation. States do not necessarily advance their 
sovereignty by attacking federal measures as intrusive acts of 
"commandeering." Sovereignty, recall, is relational. Thus, the 
active sovereign can generally be counted on to assist the larger 
community of states in times of need. 
Active sovereignty requires that states, as political 
communities, provide the sorts of direct governance opportunities 
that the federal · Constitution omits. The initiative and 
referendum will likely play a substantial role in any future 
federalism revival. Active sovereignty requires that states 
broaden the franchise, open courts to citizen complaints, and 
accept collective responsibilities. 
C. "Pooled Sovereignty'' 
States acting as agents, trustees, laboratories, and political 
communities in the circumstances above are still acting 
according to traditional federalism norms. Although they are 
seeking to expand their sovereignty by recasting the federal-state 
balance and opening new opportunities for political participation, 
states are still performing traditional functions. The active 
sovereign must do more. It must look beyond traditional 
functions, forms, and arrangements. 
As noted, sovereignty has been recast in certain international 
contexts as partial and relational. The "new sovereignty" of 
States is considered a resource rather than an absolute, 
proscriptive defense. 71 When states act in the collective, rather 
than making their own way, this is sometimes referred to as an 
70 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
71 See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 27 ("The only way most states can realize 
and express their sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that 
regulate and order the international system."). 
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exercise of "pooled" or "shared" sovereignty.72 States are 
increasingly banding together to accomplish goals that no single 
State could achieve on its own. 
The old notion of domestic state sovereignty was one of 
exclusion and isolation. State sovereignty entitled a state to 
exclude other states, and sometimes federal authorities, from its 
internal affairs. Increasingly, however, the American states, like 
European States, have been pooling their sovereignties in 
innovative ways, combining with other states in pacts, reciprocity 
agreements, and other arrangements. To advance claims to 
sovereignty in national regimes like Congress and federal 
agencies, states are exerc1smg their sovereignties not 
individually and proscriptively, but rather relationally and 
positively, in combination with other sovereigns. 
For example, seven Northeast states recently joined a regional 
pact that would limit carbon dioxide emissions linked to global 
climate change.73 Greenhouse gas emission is an issue that 
federal regulators have, for a variety of reasons, failed to address. 
Under the states' agreement, the first collective effort in the 
United States to adopt mandatory controls for greenhouse gases, 
states joining the pact would reduce emissions by 2020. Each 
state would set its own cap on emissions. The pact relies on 
innovative market principles. For example, states can 
accumulate unused excess allowances and then sell or trade 
them in an open market. Supporters of the pact insist that it will 
not only provide a sound regional solution, but will also 
encourage participating states to support clean energy 
alternatives, thereby creating local business opportunities and 
enhancing competition with European countries. 
West Coast governors have pursued another pooling strategy 
for addressing the global warming issue. They recei.i.tly agreed to 
use their combined purchasing power to buy fuel-efficient 
72 See William Wallace, The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox, 4 7 PoL. 
STUD. 503, 519 (1999) (sovereignty is increasingly '"held in common,' 'pooled among 
governments, negotiated by thousands of officials ... compromised through acceptance of 
regulations and court judgments"'). 
73 See Anthony DePalma, Greenhouse Gas Pact is in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2005, at B3. The states are Delaware, Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, and Vermont. Massachusetts and Rhode Island backed out of the agreement, 
but may decide later to re-join the pact. 
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vehicles for official use, develop uniform appliance-efficiency 
standards, collaborate to measure and report greenhouse gas 
emissions, and reduce the use of diesel generators on ships in 
California, Washington, and Oregon ports.74 The governors' 
informal agreement allowed states to achieve a common goal 
without ceding any internal sovereignty over energy or 
environmental policies. 
States have pooled their sovereignties in other ways to address 
significant policy issues. A single state that decides to sue the 
federal government is in a decidedly weaker position than a state 
that joins with two, or ten, additional states. Collective lawsuits 
by states are trending upward. Many of these lawsuits are 
positive, shared exercises of state sovereignty. Twelve states 
recently sued the federal Environmental Protection Agency to 
force it to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. 75 Similarly, 
coalitions of states have recently sued the federal government in 
challenges to the No Child Left Behind Act, Medicare 
reimbursements, energy standards, and prescription drugs. 76 
These claims face substantial burdens in the courts. But the 
lawsuits, as exercises of state sovereignty, are not solely aimed at 
achieving legal success. The apparent hope is that they may 
ultimately convince federal officials to alter policies relating to 
these critical issues. 
As noted, active sovereignty perceives sovereignty as a 
bargaining resource that states can rely upon in the course of 
participating in national institutions of governance. Concerned 
that smaller states were obtaining more than an equitable share 
of federal aid in Congress, the governors of the nation's four most 
populous states recently joined together to lobby Congress. The 
so-called "Big Four" - Arnold Schwarzenegger of California, 
George Pataki of New York, Rick Perry of Texas, and Jeb Bush of 
74 See Brad Knickerbocker, States Take the Lead on Global Warming, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 10, 2003, at 1. 
75 See Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General, Office of New 
York State Attorney General, States, Cities Environmental Groups Sue Bush 
Administration on Global Warming, Challenge EPA's Refusal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Pollution (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny. 
us/press/2003/oct/oct23a_03.html. 
76 See Evan Halper, State to Sue U.S. Over Medicare, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 2, 
2006, at B3; Juliet Williams, California to Sue Over Federal Prescription Drug Plan, THE 
SACRAMENTO UNION, Feb. 2, 2006. 
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Florida - have pooled their states' sovereignties to lobby on 
issues ranging from federal aid to energy to labor displacement. 77 
The effort may be unprecedented; political scientists, strategists, 
and historians are hard pressed to recall any similar formal 
agreements among governors. 
Pacts, collective suits, and lobbying partnerships do not 
exhaust the recent trend toward pooled state sovereignty. 
Common markets are another example. The Academic Common 
Market, for example, is a reciprocity agreement among sixteen 
southern states that allows undergraduate and graduate 
students to enroll at a university in another state while paying 
in-state tuition.78 Through this pact, states can avoid 
maintaining costly programs of study with insufficient demand; 
students of course can save tuition dollars. These reciprocity 
a,greements have grown in popularity over the past decade.79 By 
pooling sovereignty in this innovative manner, states have 
managed to partly solve internal education concerns. 
Interstate cooperation is, of course, not a new development.so 
But the states are increasingly conceptualizing and formalizing 
arrangements to address perceived national, as opposed to purely 
local or regional, issues of critical importance. A revitalized 
federalism will depend, to some extent, on activity that leverages 
individual state sovereignties in this fashion. These innovative 
exercises of shared or pooled sovereignty should be encouraged, 
studied, and perhaps replicated. But there is still much we need 
to know about these pooling arrangements. We need to know the 
conditions under which they work successfully, and under which 
they fail. How are individual state concerns within the 
cooperative addressed? How do internal state politics affect 
these pooling arrangements? What effect, if any, do these sorts 
of agreements have on internal state sovereignty? Under what 
77 See Raymond Hernandez & AI Baker, Governors Join As 'Big Four' To Pool Clout, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at Bl. 
78 See Divya Watal, Think Globally, Pay Locally, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 
5, 2005, at 55. 
79 For example, the Midwest Student Exchange Program is a similar consortium of 
six Midwestern states: Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and North 
Dakota. Bee id. 
80 See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS (2002) (noting relative lack of scholarly interest in 
interstate agreements). 
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conditions have they actually altered national policies? States 
should be examining these arrangements, sharing information 
and resources with other states, and joining collective efforts 
where joint action is appropriate. 
THE STATES AS "DEMI-SOVEREIGNS": FOREIGN RELATIONS 
All of the foregoing examples implicate active internal 
sovereignty- control over matters of mostly local concern. One 
of the principal obstacles to viewing the domestic states as 
sovereign has been the (mostly) implied prohibition on their 
exercising authority in matters touching on foreign affairs.81 The 
states do not possess external sovereignty, in the sense of being 
authorized to deal directly with foreign nations. As a result <;>f 
the dormant foreign affairs power and the dormant foreign 
commerce power, courts have effectively precluded the states 
from affecting matters as to which it is said the United States 
must "speak with one voice."82 
The active sovereign refuses to accept antiquated notions of its 
"proper" place not only within the federal system, but also in the 
world. Although technically constrained by dormant foreign 
affairs doctrines, some scholars have noted that states have 
heightened their international profile.83 Indeed, one scholar 
suggests that the states have recently been treated as "demi-
sovereigns" - de facto powers in their own right - in foreign 
relations.84 Conditions of modernity, in particular advances in 
communications technology and globalization, have caused "a 
marked blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic 
affairs."85 State and local governments have been more 
conspicuous players on the international scene, particularly with 
81 There are of course some textual limitations on states in this regard. See, e.g., U.S. 
CONST. art. I. § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting states from entering agreements or compacts with 
foreign powers). 
82 See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979); 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the "One· Voice" Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. 
L. REV. 975, 979-88 (2001) (describing and criticizing the "one voice" doctrine). 
83 See, e.g. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 
1275 (1999). 
84 See id. at 1225. 
85 See id. at 1247. 
2007] AC17VE SOVEREIGNTY 571 
regard to matters of trade and investment, but also with respect 
to human rights issues.86 On the ground, states maintain trade 
offices abroad, enter trade agreements with foreign countries, 
and routinely send out foreign trade missions.87 
Thus, state claims to a measure of external sovereignty have 
begun to arise from efforts to influence economic and other 
policies in international regimes. Here, again, is an indication of 
the importance of looking for the federalism revival on the 
ground and in the world. It has long been the case that states 
play a far more active role in foreign affairs than federalism 
doctrine would suggest they should.88 Today, the states are 
positioned to act separately from the federal government in many 
areas of foreign affairs, to pursue their own and their political 
communities' interests abroad. State activity has created the 
conditions under which "a new doctrine of subnational 
responsibility'' is taking hold.89 Increasingly, foreign 
governments perceive states as separate sovereigns. In 
constructive terms, collective agreements are beginning to form 
regarding states' sovereignty in external matters. Foreign 
nations sometimes deal directly with the states on matters such 
as tax policy, immigrants' rights, and the death penalty.90 This 
means that California, or Texas, are individually subject to 
discipline, or "targeted retaliation," for their actions.91 This is one 
indication that state claims to de facto sovereignty are gammg 
some traction abroad. 
Within still largely undefined limits, states have unique 
opportunities to make claims to sovereignty on a global stage. As 
active sovereigns, states should be eager to take advantage of 
86 See id. ("The magnitude of state and local international activity has grown 
dramatically in recent years.") See generally EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1998) (describing rising 
influence of states in foreign affairs). 
87 See FRY, supra note 86, at 84-88 (describing state and local trade missions). 
88 See Cleveland, supra note 82, at 991 ("Despite the apparent clarity of the 
constitutional text, actual relations between the states and the national government over 
foreign relations have been significantly more nuanced, and the boundaries of state 
authority remain unclear."). 
89 Spiro, supra note 83, at 1261. 
90 See id. at 1261-70; see also Carla Fried, How States Are Aiming to Keep Dollars Out 
of Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, C5 (describing state laws barring public pension 
funds from investing in companies with ties to· Sudan, a country accused of extensive 
human rights violations). 
91 Spiro, supra note 83, at 1261. 
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opportunities to act as agent, trustee, community, and innovator 
in a vast new global environment. States can use their spending 
and other powers to express moral claims, direct the expenditure 
of substantial funds, procure business opportunities for citizens 
back home, control their borders, and encourage policy changes 
at the national and international levels. 
To be sure, substantial constitutional and political checks still 
constrain the states' foreign affairs activity. This is as it must 
be. There are instances in which the country still must speak 
with one voice. National security is an obvious example, and 
there is no doubting that federal authorities will remain 
committed to having "one voice" on such matters. But federal 
authorities should hesitate to interfere with most state 
prerogatives overseas, especially those dealing with trade and 
investment. Congress will naturally hesitate to intervene, often 
for political reasons. But there are constitutional reasons for 
permitting state activity in these areas. Like any other 
structural principle, federalism must be flexible. It must be able 
to respond to and accommodate globalization and other 
conditions of modernity. More to the point, our federalism must 
recognize the on-the-ground reality that states are now global 
actors.92 Their sovereignty can no longer be confined within our 
borders.93 
An expansion of state sovereignty does not entail political 
actors and courts sitting idly by while states cause major 
disruptions in foreign affairs and visit substantial harm on the 
Union. It merely suggests that "the rule of federal exclusivity no 
longer presents an imperative the way it once arguably did."94 
When this principle ought to apply, and which institution is best 
situated to enforce it, would be fruitful paths for future academic 
research. In the meantime, the best advice for states is to 
continue practicing active state sovereignty in foreign arenas. A 
92 See Cleveland, supra note 82, at 995 (noting historical tolerance by federal 
government of local activity touching foreign affairs). 
93 Courts seeking to encourage a more vibrant federalism should not aggressively 
graft "dormant" limitations on foreign affairs and commerce powers. Nor should they, as 
they have in the domestic context, use a broad interpretation of implied preemption to 
negate state actions overseas. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (invalidating, on preemption grounds, a Massachusetts Jaw barring state entities 
from doing business with companies operating in Burma). 
94 Spiro, supra note 83, at 1259. 
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federalism revival must extend beyond narrow notions of "local" 
concern. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's "federalism revival" did not produce any 
substantive alteration of the federal-state ordering of power. 
Minimalist opinions marking off outer bounds of congressional 
power did not revive federalism in any significant way. 
Emphasizing the status, dignity, and esteem of states might 
make states "feel" better. Ultimately, however, a judicially 
imposed status sovereignty cannot sustain a robust and vital 
federalism. 
If there is to be a federalism revival, it must be based upon 
states doing, not merely being. It must be a bottom-up, rather 
than a top-down, phenomenon. States must engage their own 
sovereignty, treating it as something that is not given to them, 
but always at stake and ultimately earned in the world. The 
concept of active sovereignty recognizes that states become 
sovereign only to the extent that they exercise sovereign 
functions and are, as a result, treated as sovereign. The active 
sovereign must be innovative. It must take the lead on critical 
matters and in emergencies, create vibrant political 
communities, establish and use new arrangements of power, and 
stake claims to sovereignty in arenas not traditionally associated 
with statehood. 
Active sovereignty demonstrates that state sovereignty does 
not conflict with, but actually enhances and supports, popular 
sovereignty. A citizen without safe food to eat, clean air to 
breathe, a job, a living wage, and the means to participate 
directly in governance is herself a diminished sovereign. The 
active state sovereign is not concerned with ego or status. It is 
concerned, rather, with providing the conditions for popular 
sovereignty. The principal beneficiaries of active sovereignty will 
not be the states, as has been the result in the Court's status 
sovereignty rulings, but the people themselves. 
